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Arrested Development in Search Law: A Look at
Disputed Consent Through the Lens of Trespass Law
in a Post-Jones Fourth Amendment—Have We Arrived
at Disputed Analysis?
J. Bryan Boyd
ABSTRACT
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry I could not travel both”

Much like the words of Robert Frost in “The Road Not Taken,” we have
arrived at a point in the law of Fourth Amendment search analysis where two
roads appear before us: privacy or property. Recently, there has been a
development in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that requires a closer
examination of the proper direction to take. Specifically, the issue of disputed
consent and the appropriate search inquiry in these cases presents a crossroads
for the Court. What road will it choose? Does it matter?
Beyond this, however, exists a greater problem: what happens when the two
rules of search—Katz expectation of privacy and Jones trespass onto property—
conflict? What happens when the Katz rule says yes to a situation involving
what is determined as an unreasonable search and the Jones rule says no? Do
we have a situation of disputed analysis in our disputed consent decisions of
our Court? When considering the ambit of modern search law, further
complicated by the resurgence of the trespass test by Justice Scalia, three crucial
observations appear:
(1) Prior to Jones, the key inquiry in cases of third-party consent was
grounded in terms of expectations of privacy. In the particular situation of
disputed consent by co-occupants, the rule was that a present objector to consent
defeated the wishes of another co-occupant (no trumps yes). Since Jones,
however, Justice Scalia has called for a reconsideration of this rule in light of
trespass. Through his concurrence in Fernandez v. California, Justice Scalia
declared that the police, with the consent of a co-occupant, are not liable under
trespass when the police enter the home to search, irrespective of an objecting cooccupant. Much like the question of whether no trumps yes in disputed consent
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cases, the new question for the post-Jones Court will be whether no trumps yes in
cases of disputed search analysis.
(2) The utilization of the current test for a Fourth Amendment search
under a property-based framework supports Justice Scalia’s assertion that a
consent police search is reasonable. The police are granted a license to enter the
property, through the consent of a co-occupant. In light of this determination,
the police would stand in the shoes of the grantor of the license and are immune
from trespass, despite the objections of another co-occupant.
(3) Because of this development, in disputed consent cases, it appears likely
that the Court could arrive at a different conclusion depending upon which test
for a search the Court chooses to use. Similar to the problem of disputed consent,
where one co-occupant says yes and the other says no, we may very well have
arrived at a place in our Fourth Amendment understanding where disputed
analysis, trespass or privacy, threatens to cloud an already obscured view of
search law. For now, we are marooned to fight over the directions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry I could not travel both”1
Much like the words of Robert Frost in “The Road Not Taken,”2
we have arrived at a point in the law of Fourth Amendment search
analysis where two roads appear before us: privacy or property.
Recently, there has been a development in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that requires a closer examination of the proper
direction to take. Specifically, the issue of disputed consent and the
appropriate search inquiry in these cases presents a crossroads for the
Court. What road will it choose? Does it matter?
When it comes to situations of disputed consent police searches
of homes involving physically present co-occupants, the rule has been
simple: no trumps yes.3 Yet, there have been some significant
developments since the Supreme Court visited this issue in Georgia v.
Randolph.4 Most notably, Justice Scalia in United States v. Jones has singlehandedly resurrected the property-based trespass inquiry for searches.5
Given the resurgence of trespass analysis, would a majority of the Court
decide a case like Randolph differently? Would the Court abandon this
exception that was grounded upon the privacy-based scrutiny of
“shared social expectations”6 in favor of adopting a trespass test for
physical intrusions in the home?
Most recently, the Court in Fernandez v. California considered
whether it would extend the Randolph rule to circumstances when the
police arrest and remove the protesting co-occupant and return to seek
consent from another occupant.7 While the Court resolves the issue by
concluding that the rule in Randolph does not apply,8 what may be most
1

ROBERT FROST, MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1921).
FROST, supra note 1.
3
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
4
See id.
5
132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (“But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”). See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
6
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (There is “great significance given to widely shared
social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but
not controlled by its rules.”).
7
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1128 (2014).
8
Id. at 1130.
2
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notable is the separate concurrence of Justice Scalia.9 Even in its
brevity, we see a glimpse of his trespass-based influence on Fernandez.
But perhaps more importantly, we see how this may have very well
influenced a different decision in Randolph10—a decision that based
upon trespass, an objecting co-occupant would not trump the wishes
of another consenting occupant. If this is the case, does this mean,
depending upon the path the Court chooses to follow, it may reach
different conclusions where yes may trump no?
This Article will examine the decisions of Randolph and Fernandez
from the perspective of the newly revitalized rule of trespass through
the lens of its reviver, Justice Scalia. This Article will conclude that
under the trespass-based search analysis, the police may validly search
a home based upon the consent of a co-occupant, regardless of a
physically present objecting co-occupant.11 Therefore, this Article will
conclude that Randolph may have been erroneously decided, given
today’s return to trespass law for Fourth Amendment search analysis.
Beyond this, however, this Article presents a greater problem: what
happens when the two rules of search—Katz expectation of privacy or
Jones trespass onto property—conflict? What happens when the Katz
rule says yes to a situation involving what is determined as an
unreasonable search and the Jones rule says no? Much like the
conflicting co-occupants scenario in both Fernandez and Randolph, does
no trump yes to determine if there was an unreasonable search?
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of how the Fourth
Amendment has defined a search. In it, we see the shift from a
property-based analysis founded under physical trespass to a privacybased analysis, heralded into existence by the decision in Katz v. United
States.12 Later, the Article examines the return to prominence of the
trespass test to define a search in the Justice Scalia majority opinions
of Jones and Florida v. Jardines.13 These developments to the law of
search provide the impetus to revisit the issue raised in Randolph.
Part II presents the crossroads of search analysis through the cases
9

Id. at 113738 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1137 (“I believe Georgia v. Randolph was wrongly decided.”) (citation
omitted).
11
There could be a variety of ways to describe the relationship between the parties
and their interests to the property (co-tenant, tenant in common, etc.) as
contemplated by the Court in this examination. I will use the term “occupant” or “cooccupant” throughout this Article to describe an individual who possesses “common
authority” over the property. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7
(1974).
12
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
10
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of disputed consent as a guide. It examines the decisions of Randolph
(pre-Jones) and Fernandez (post-Jones) together and concludes that
Justice Scalia’s trespass analysis provides an alternate rationale to the
decisions.
Part III of this Article proposes that if the trespass analysis is here
to stay in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it could significantly alter
the way we view search law and could threaten to further obscure our
understanding of administrable rules under property or privacy. This
part explains how the police may properly search a home based on
consent over an objecting co-occupant. Using an understanding of
property as the lens, an objecting co-tenant may not claim trespass
against a person who is licensed by another co-tenant to enter the
home. Finally, this Article suggests that because of the potential for
opposing results, depending on the test used to access the meaning of
a search, we may have reached a claim of disputed analysis that requires
immediate resolution.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME AND PRIVATE SPACE: THE LAW OF
SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

“Then took the other, as just as fair, and perhaps the better claim.”14
To attempt to plot the course of the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the law of searches is, in no small measure, a
Herculean task. While the Fourth Amendment’s text provides in plain
terms “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”15 the
journey towards defining what constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment is fraught with twists and turns.16 Over time, three distinct
paths emerged.

14

See FROST, supra note 1, at 9.
See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
16
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless
and badly off course . . . .”).
15
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A. In the Beginning, Trespass Was King17
Prior to Katz, the test for a Fourth Amendment search was a
property-based question18: whether the government physically
intruded into a constitutionally protected area.19 The origin of the test
can be traced back to an understanding of the English law of trespass.20
Often repeated in both pre-Katz cases, as well as in the Scalia version
of trespass in Jones, is the English case of Entick v. Carrington.21 The
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States22 made clear that Entick’s
“celebrated judgment,”23 denouncing the practice of general warrant
searches in private homes, was so monumental that “its propositions
were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what
was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 It was under this
view that “every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass.”25
Despite this broad proclamation of constitutional protections
under trespass, the Court has grappled with the contours of the
meaning of an actionable invasion of private property, often
producing rigid results. In what appeared to be two very similar factual
scenarios of government monitoring of conversations taking place on
private property, the Court held in Goldman v. United States26 that the
monitoring of an office was not a violation under the Fourth
Amendment, but in Silverman v. United States27 that the monitoring of a
gambling establishment was actionable.
17

See Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return to Trespass—Good News or Bad,
82 MISS. L.J. 879, 879 (2013) (“For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, trespass
was king in regard to Fourth Amendment searches.”).
18
But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 67 (2012) (discussing that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era”).
19
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962) (determining whether a visitor’s
room of a jail qualifies as a “constitutionally protected area”).
20
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington,
19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)) (“By the laws of England, every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground
without my license, . . . which is proved by every declaration in trespass where the
defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the
soil.”).
21
19 How. St. Tr. at 1029.
22
Genealogical research by the author of this Article has not revealed a familial
connection between the author and the claimant of the thirty-five cases of plate glass.
23
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627.
24
Id. at 626–27.
25
Id. at 627–28 (quoting Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029).
26
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
27
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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In both cases, the government gathered incriminating
information by listening to conversations coming from a private area.28
The difference in these two contradictory outcomes was not the type
of room that was monitored; rather, it was whether or not the
government physically intruded into the area.29 In the case of
Silverman, it came down to a matter of inches.30
Prior to Silverman, the Court ruled that the placement of a sound
amplification listening device against a common wall in order to hear
the private conversations of the suspects was not a search.31 In
Silverman, however, the Court found a violation of the Fourth
Amendment when the government inserted a listening device several
inches into a common wall.32 A physical intrusion occurred when the
device made contact with a heating duct belonging to the suspect’s
property.33 While the Court considered in dicta the potential threats
to privacy due to advances in eavesdropping technology,34 it
distinguished this case from Goldman because of the “reality of an
actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”35
This reality of an actual intrusion trespass test often produced
absurd results. The Court continued to allow the government
monitoring of private property, so long as there was no physical
trespass. In Olmstead v. United States, the government did not seek a
warrant and installed wiretaps into the telephone wires of at least four
homes and an office of individuals suspected of conspiring to violate
prohibition laws.36 Despite the fact that the government listened in on
the private calls from the homes for a period of many months, the
Olmstead Court ruled that the government did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.37 Again, the rationale for this decision was that the
government action did not amount to a trespass since the wiretaps
were placed on telephone lines outside of the suspects’ homes.38 The
Court, applying an unbending formalism to the view of searches,
28

Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 129.
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 129.
30
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
31
Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131.
32
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 508–09.
35
Id. at 512.
36
277 U.S. 438, 456 (1928).
37
Id. at 466.
38
Id. at 465 (“By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application
for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far
distant place.”).
29
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explained that the “language of the amendment cannot be extended
and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world
from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not
part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which
they are stretched.”39
While decisions like Goldman and Olmstead controlled the law of
searches during this time, there would appear some signs along the
way to suggest a possible change of direction. Justice Douglas, in his
concurrence in Silverman, suggested that a fork in the road was on the
horizon.40 The wrong was not trespass. Instead, the wrong involved an
invasion of privacy “when the intimacies of the home were tapped,
recorded, or revealed.”41 We would not have to wait long before the
Court embarked on this new heading.
B. The King Is Dead! Long Live Privacy and the Katz Test
With one swift blow, the Katz Court effectively eradicated the
trespass test.42 Prior to the 1967 decision of Katz, it seemed that the
rule limiting a search to a physical invasion into a constitutionally
protected area would continue to control. In Katz, the government
sought to intercept telephone communications by attaching a listening
device to the outside of a public telephone booth.43 Relying upon the
precedent of Olmstead and Goldman, the government contended that a
Fourth Amendment search was not implicated since the agents never
physically penetrated the telephone booth.44 Even the petitioner in
Katz framed the issue before the Court as a question of trespass.45
In a dramatic change of direction, the Court embraced a privacybased test over the property-based trespass analysis as it proclaimed
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”46 In addressing
the government’s contention that this case should be controlled by
39

Id.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
41
Id. (“Rather our sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the home
was invaded.”).
42
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43
Id. at 348.
44
Id. at 352.
45
Id. at 34950 (declining to answer the questions presented to the Court of
“[w]hether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that
evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of
such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth”
and “[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary
before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution”).
46
Id. at 351.
40
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Olmstead and Goldman, the Katz Court responded that the “premise that
property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited.”47 When the Court concluded that “the
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can
no longer be regarded as controlling,”48 it appeared as though the
trespass test was dead.49
Instead of focusing on whether the government intruded into a
constitutionally protected area, the Katz search test inquired into
whether an individual has a constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy.50 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz provided the clearest
explanation of the privacy-based inquiry: the Fourth Amendment is
triggered when there is government action involving a defendant
exhibiting both an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and a
reasonable (objective) expectation of privacy.51 Even though both
requirements must be met, the landscape of search law post-Katz
turned on whether there was a reasonable52 (or legitimate) expectation
of privacy.53 While it is clear Katz signaled a seismic shift in the law of
searches, its full impact has yet to be completely realized,54 particularly
47

Id. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any
‘technical trespass under . . . local property law.’”) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
48
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
49
But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“While existing
scholarship often interprets the shift as a wholesale rejection of property-based
principles in Fourth Amendment law, it is better understood as a shift of degree from
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that currently governs.”).
50
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 361 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
52
See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
504 (2007) (concluding that “the reasonable expectation of privacy test is the central
mystery of Fourth Amendment law”).
53
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy in police inspection of curtilage of home from a helicopter flying at 400 feet);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage left on street curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in police inspection of curtilage of home from a fixed-wing
aircraft flying at 1000 feet); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in confiding in an informant who
was carrying a radio transmitter).
54
See James T. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision
of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 647 (1985) (“Katz merely
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now that the trespass test has come back from the dead.
C. It’s Alive! Justice Scalia Resurrects Trespass Through Jones and
Jardines
Like any good horror movie involving a villain that will not die,55
the law of trespass surprisingly comes back to life56 to wreak havoc on
the landscape of search jurisprudence. “This time it’s personal.”57 It is
personal because Justice Scalia is the person most responsible for
breathing life back into the trespass test.58 While the Court
unanimously concluded that the government’s installation of a global
positioning system (“GPS”) device to a suspect’s vehicle constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment, the 2012 Jones decision marked
a considerable rift in how the Justices consider modern search law.59
Prior to Jones, the installation and electronic monitoring of a
vehicle on public roads through a GPS tracker was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment.60 The rationale behind the rule was based
upon the Court’s use of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
in the pre-GPS technology beeper cases of Unites States v. Knotts61 and

began the revolution, presenting the challenge of understanding and defining fourth
amendment privacy and developing workable doctrine.”).
55
Jason Voorhees from Friday the 13th and Freddy Krueger from A Nightmare on
Elm Street come to mind.
56
See, e.g., Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United
States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 690 (2013) (“[M]any were
left utterly shocked by the Court’s almost total rejection” of the Court’s decision in
Katz and other authorities “in favor of a doctrine that most believed was dead—the
‘trespass doctrine.’”).
57
See JAWS: THE REVENGE (Universal Pictures July 17, 1987) (promoting the film
with the tagline, “this time it’s personal”); See also, BACK TO THE FUTURE: PART II
(Universal Pictures Nov. 22, 1989) (involving a scene of a theater showing the fictitious
film Jaws 19 with the tagline, “this time it’s REALLY personal”).
58
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012). See also Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
59
See Nancy Forster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones Resuscitates Property Law
Concepts in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 445, 446–47 (2013)
(Justice Scalia’s insistence that property law concepts had never died “will no doubt
come as a surprise to many in the legal community, including fellow Supreme Court
justices, who thought the use of property law, and more specifically the doctrine of
trespass, in the Fourth Amendment context had been overruled by the Court in Katz
v. United States.”).
60
See United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 229 (3d Cir. 2013) (Van Antwerpen,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Prior to Jones there was “a uniform consensus
across the federal courts of appeals to address the issue that the installation and
subsequent use of GPS or GPS-like devices was not a search or, at most, was as search
but did not require a warrant.”).
61
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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Unites States v. Karo.62 The Knotts Court equated the use of tracking the
movements of a vehicle on the public highways by following the beeper
signals to that of police visual surveillance and concluded that an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
travels.63
Much like the impact of the Katz decision that surprised the legal
community over forty years ago, Justice Scalia changed the course of
modern search law with his opinion in Jones.64 Writing for the fivejustice majority,65 Justice Scalia concluded the government’s
installation of a GPS device underneath the defendant’s Jeep while it
was parked in a public parking lot and subsequent twenty-eight day
monitoring of the vehicle’s movements amounted to a search.66
Instead of relying upon the reasonable expectation of privacy test in
Katz, Justice Scalia directed the Court back to a property-based
analysis.67
With one swift blow, Justice Scalia introduced a “new” test under
the Fourth Amendment: a search occurs when the government
commits a trespass into a constitutionally protected area68 for the
purpose of obtaining information.69 Citing previous property-based
decisions of the Court such as Entick,70 Boyd,71 and Olmstead,72 Justice
Scalia concluded that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
62

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“[A] person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”). But see Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (determining that the “monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance” amounts
to a search that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
64
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
65
Id. (Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurring opinion while Justice Alito,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment.).
66
Id. at 948–49.
67
Id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons,
houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.
Katz did not repudiate that
understanding.”) (footnote omitted).
68
It would seem here that Justice Scalia did not necessarily embrace the full
understanding of the English common law understanding from Entick that “every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.” Instead, Justice Scalia’s
view of the property interest (a constitutionally protected area) would include only
those areas of property that touch on the enumerated commands of the Fourth
Amendment (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”). See id. at 949.
69
Id.
70
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
71
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
72
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
63
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has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”73
It seemed that Justice Scalia did not seek to create a new test. Instead,
he sought to remind the Court of a time when the law of property74
informed the understanding of the Fourth Amendment.75
Not everyone on the Court shared Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for
the reintroduction of the trespass test. Writing a concurrence in the
judgment only, and joined by three other Justices, Justice Alito scoffed
at the trespass rationale presented by Justice Scalia and the majority.76
Instead, Justice Alito rejected the attempt to couch the issue of search
in property terms77 and urged that the decision was properly decided
under Katz “by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectation of
privacy rights were violated by the long-term monitoring of the vehicle
he drove.”78
While Justice Sotomayor joined with the Scalia majority rationale
as the fifth vote, she penned a separate concurrence that accepted
Justice Scalia’s trespass test to resolve the immediate issue in Jones.79 At
the same time, however, she expressed doubts about the utility of the
trespass test in many situations involving the lack of physical invasion
and reaffirmed that the Katz analysis will often be more appropriate in
determining modern search law.80 Justice Sotomayor went further,
however, and expressed grave concerns over short-term GPS
monitoring, in contrast to Justice Alito’s acceptance of the practice.81
Even more significantly, Justice Sotomayor called into question the
notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
73

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
Id. at 949 (stating that “the text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close
connection to property” and that “our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century”).
75
But see Brian Sawers, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Making Sure Your History Is Just as
Wrong as Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 26 (Feb. 2013) (“Both
the majority and concurring opinions in Jones are wrong about the state of the law in
1791 [regarding trespass].”).
76
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (The Jones majority holding “strains
the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth
Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.”).
77
Id. at 960 (“The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seizure has been discredited.”) (citations omitted).
78
Id. at 958.
79
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
80
Id. (stating that “the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little
guidance” in situations of electronic surveillance that do not involve a physical
penetration and that these kind of situations would “remain subject to Katz analysis”).
81
Id. (addressing that due to the nature of the kind of information made available
by GPS monitoring such as details about an individual’s “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations,” the “Katz analysis will require
particular attention”).
74
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the information disclosed to third parties.82 In considering the “digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks,”83 Justice Sotomayor did not simply re-affirm Katz. Instead, she
may have suggested another “new” test to enhance privacy under Katz.84
After Jones, the test for a search doubled in size and complexity.
Many questions emerged from Justice Scalia’s salvo. Which test
controls the law of search: Katz, Jones, or both? Is one test more
appropriate depending upon the facts and circumstances presented in
a given situation? Many wondered if the trespass test would fade back
into history. It would take a mere fourteen months to learn from the
Court’s opinion in Jardines that the trespass test is here to stay for the
time being.
For the first time since the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz, there
existed a real question as to what test for a search should control:
property or privacy. Specifically, the Jardines Court wrestled with the
issue of the government’s use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch
of a home for the purpose of investigating a potential grow house.85
The Court in a 5-4 decision held that the government’s actions did, in
fact, constitute a search.86 How the Court reached this decision,
however, showed the marked divide between the Justices.
Relying on his most recent search decision in Jones, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion utilized the property-based test of trespass87 and
determined that the government committed a search when it
physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area for the
purpose of obtaining information.88 In doing so, he reaffirmed the
primacy of the home under the Fourth Amendment89 and recognized
the extension of the home’s protection to the curtilage.90 Justice Scalia
82

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
84
Id; see also Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 333–36 (2012) (arguing that Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence represents a “super-Katz” view).
85
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
86
Id. at 1417–18 (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
87
But see Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 879
(2014) (suggesting that the Jardines majority “shrink[s] from the use of the word
‘trespass’”).
88
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50).
89
Id. at 1414 (“[T]he home is first among equals.”).
90
Id. (“[T]he area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—
what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
83
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concluded the government’s investigation amounted to an
“unlicensed physical intrusion” on the porch, which was within the
constitutionally protected area of the curtilage.91 Consequently, the
intrusion equated to a Fourth Amendment search.92
While Justice Scalia acknowledged the existence of the Katz
privacy test generally, he refused to apply it to the Jardines facts.93
Instead, he announced a clear preference for the trespass test under
the facts by stating that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s
property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”94
Other Justices in the majority, however, were uncomfortable not
giving Katz its due. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor, wrote a separate concurrence to Jardines.95 Rather than
apply a single test for a search, Justice Kagan emphasized that both
standards were satisfied.96 She justified the use of both tests due to the
closely aligned property and privacy interests in the case of a home
search97 and stated: “Was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds
today. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well.”98
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy
and Breyer, ridiculed both the majority and concurring opinions’
application of the law of search, irrespective of the test chosen.99 In his
dissent, Justice Alito declared that the government’s activity did not
amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment.100 While he
criticized the majority Justices’ Katz and Jones analysis to the facts,
Justice Alito reserved his sharpest criticism for the trespass test when
he declared that Justice Scalia’s decision was “based on a putative rule
of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the annals of AngloAmerican jurisprudence.”101
The trespass test for a search remains viable and was utilized as
recently as this past term by the Court.102 In a per curiam decision, the
purposes.’”) (citation omitted).
91
Id. at 1415.
92
Id. at 1417–18.
93
Id. at 1417.
94
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“That the officers learned what they learned only by
physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish
that a search occurred.”).
95
Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1419 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S 103, 111 (2006)).
98
Id. at 1418.
99
Id. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1421.
101
Id. at 1420.
102
See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
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Court in Grady v. North Carolina determined North Carolina’s satellitebased monitoring of recidivist sex offenders constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment.103 In reaching its decision, the Court
reaffirmed the trespass test under Jones and Jardines and concluded
“[i]n light of these decisions, it follows that a State also conducts a
search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent,
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”104 Without
mention of the privacy test of Katz, the Court based its conclusion that
the conduct in Grady amounted to a search solely on the trespass test
where the government physically intruded upon a suspect’s body for
the purpose of obtaining information.105
In light of the current state of search law, we have arrived at a
crossroads. As the Court encounters the question of whether the
government’s activity implicates the Fourth Amendment, what path
will it choose in future cases? Depending upon the particular factual
circumstances, will the Court determine that one test is not applicable
and apply a different test inevitably? For example, will the Court use
exclusively the Jones test for physical invasions but use the Katz test to
potential searches not involving a physical trespass?106 Or will the Court
apply both tests for a search, similar to the approach utilized by Justice
Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines? If the Court attempts to use both
tests, what if the tests produce inconsistent results that require
immediate resolution? If Katz says yes but Jones says no, what should be
the result? Consider these questions through the lens of the disputed
consent cases of Randolph107 and Fernandez.108 It seems that the view may
be particularly murky.

103

Id. at 1370.
Id.
105
Id. at 1371. The Court, however, did not reach a decision as to whether the
government committed an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
106
See id.
107
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
108
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
104
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II. THE PATH OF SEARCH LAW ARRIVES AT A FORK IN THE ROAD. DOES
NO TRUMP YES?: THE CURIOUS CASE OF DISPUTED CONSENT AS GUIDE
“And both that morning equally lay in leaves no step had trodden black.”109
The text110 of the Fourth Amendment suggests,111 and a number of
leading decisions from the Court have determined,112 that
governmental searches and seizures require a warrant to pass
constitutional scrutiny, “subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”113 Over the years, the Court has
grappled114 with the issue of whether warrants should be required in
search cases or if the key inquiry is whether the government acted
reasonably under the circumstances.115
Despite the debate, the reality is that the exceptions to obtaining
a warrant are “neither few nor well-delineated.”116 One of the most
109

See FROST, supra note 1, at 9.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
111
But see Amar, supra note 16, at 759 (“We need to read the Amendment’s words
and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of
evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”).
112
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“‘Over and again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires
adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment . . . .”) (citations omitted) (first alteration in original).
113
Id.
114
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[O]ur jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”); id. at 583 (“In my view, the path
out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle that the
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that
the common law afforded.”).
115
It seems that the reasonableness approach is the most often repeated
justification for searches and seizures as seen in two of the most recent Fourth
Amendment cases before the Court. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014) (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
is ‘reasonableness.’’”) (citations omitted). See also Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.
530, 536 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment
allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway
for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”) (citations omitted).
116
See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1473–75 (explaining that “[t]here are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or
the warrant requirement or both” and that “[t]he reason that all of these exceptions
have grown up is simple: the clear rule that warrants are required is unworkable and
to enforce it would lead to exclusion of evidence in many cases where the police activity
110
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common exceptions to the warrant requirement, establishing that the
police acted “reasonabl[y],” is consent.117 As the rules for consent have
developed over time,118 the most often litigated situations occur in the
context of “third-party” consent.119 In particular, though, the most
intriguing cases have appeared within the framework of disputed
consent between co-occupants, such as in the cases of Randolph120 and
Fernandez.121 In these two cases, the Court struggled to answer under
the circumstances when one co-occupant says yes to a search, but
another says no.
In all cases of third-party consent, the key inquiry, to date, has
been grounded in terms of privacy.122 The Court has evolved in its view
of privacy and the motivation supporting its holdings.123 Through
much of its history until Fernandez, the Court did not consider any
other basis to support its views. To be sure, there has been some
discussion of property in the cases of consent; however, it has been
limited to a Katz understanding of the relationship between property
and the Fourth Amendment.124
Of course, prior to Jones, there was no reason to think any other
way than in terms of privacy. Then came Jones. Has Jones, and Justice
Scalia’s property-based analysis specifically, changed the way we should
view the disputed consent cases of Randolph and Fernandez?

was essentially reasonable”).
117
See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (“A warrantless consent
search is reasonable and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment irrespective of
the availability of a warrant.”); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184–85
(1990).
118
See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
119
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (stating the authority
“clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that
authority is shared”); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (extending the consent rule in
that the police may lawfully conduct a warrantless entry of a home based upon the
consent of an individual whom the police “reasonably (though erroneously) believe
that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises”).
120
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S 103 (2006).
121
134 S. Ct. at 1126.
122
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 190.
123
Compare Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170–71 (citing its decision of Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731 (1969) and utilizing an “assumption of the risk” approach), with Rodriguez,
497 U.S. at 179, 188 (utilizing a “reasonableness” standard when the police reasonably
believe an individual has “common authority” to consent) and Randolph, 547 U.S. at
111 (utilizing a “widely shared social expectations” approach).
124
See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110 (“Consistent with our prior understanding that
Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of property . . . .”) (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) for comparison).
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A. Georgia v. Randolph (Pre-Jones): No Trumps Yes in Disputed
Consent
In 2006, the Court resolved the case of disputed consent to search
a home in Georgia v. Randolph.125 Prior to Randolph, however, several
circuit courts had considered and determined that the consent of an
individual was valid, despite a present protestor to consent.126 In
Randolph, the Court considered a case that began when the police
responded to a marital dispute at the Randolph home.127 Once the
police arrived, the respondent’s wife, Janet, complained that her
husband was abusing cocaine and that she feared he would take their
son away from her.128 Soon, the respondent arrived and disputed
Janet’s allegations.129 Instead, he offered that it was Janet who had a
substance abuse problem.130 Janet maintained her accusations against
the respondent and told the police that there was evidence of
respondent’s drug use in the home.131
An officer first asked the respondent for consent to search the
home.132 The respondent, an attorney, refused the request.133 Next,
the officer asked Janet for consent to search, and she responded
affirmatively.134 Once inside the home, Janet took the officer upstairs
to the respondent’s bedroom.135 There, the officer observed a drinking
straw containing traces of what appeared to be cocaine.136 The officer
seized the straw and later sought a search warrant to search the
premises for further evidence.137 As a result of the initial evidence
obtained by the consent of Janet and the later search of the home
pursuant to a valid warrant, the respondent was charged with drug
125

Id. at 103.
See, e.g., United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Morning, 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d
882 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.
1977).
127
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.
134
Id.
135
Id. Janet told the officer that she and her son had been staying away from the
home for several weeks and that she had returned recently. In addition, she informed
the officer the bedroom was the respondent’s.
136
Id.
137
Id. Interestingly, Janet withdrew her consent shortly after the officer seized the
drinking straw.
126
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possession.138
The precise issue before the Randolph Court was “whether one
occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared
premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to
permit a search.”139 Instead of following the wave of circuit court
decisions supporting such a search, the Court held140 that under the
circumstances here “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal
to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search
unreasonable and invalid as to [respondent].”141
The basis of Justice Souter’s majority opinion appeared to be both
a continuation and evolution of the Court’s prior third-party consent
decisions,142 such as United States v. Matlock143 and Illinois v. Rodriguez.144
Justice Souter maintained that the proper analysis relied upon a
consideration of what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
by a view of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.145 His
opinion considered the relationship between property and privacy but
concluded, much like the earlier Katz Court, that while property rights
may be considered, they are not to serve as a limitation146 to the broader
implications of privacy.147
The majority opinion, however, took the foundation of privacy
law and built upon it a newly advanced theory of “widely shared social
expectations.”148 Citing the social guest case of Minnesota v. Olson149 for

138

Id.
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108.
140
Id. at 105. The Court’s decision was divided 5-3, with Justice Souter writing the
majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief
Justice Roberts, in his first term on the Court, filed his first dissent, which was joined
by Justice Scalia. Additionally, Justices Scalia and Thomas filed separate dissents.
Justice Alito assumed office on January 31, 2006, but did not participate in the opinion.
141
Id. at 106.
142
Id. at 109–10.
143
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
144
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
145
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110–11.
146
Id. at 110 (Citing Katz, Justice Souter explained that “[c]onsistent with our prior
understanding that Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of
property . . . the third party’s ‘common authority’ is not synonymous with a technical
property interest . . . .”).
147
Id. (“The common authority that counts under the Fourth Amendment may
thus be broader that the rights accorded by property law . . . .”).
148
Id. at 111 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment
reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely
shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of
property, but not controlled by its rules.”).
149
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
139
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the proposition that an overnight guest to a home has a reasonable
expectation of privacy,150 Justice Souter concluded that a “co-inhabitant
naturally has an even stronger claim.”151 From this, Justice Souter
theorized a variety of situations that would suggest a third-party could
not be authorized to enter a home over the objections of a cooccupant.152
Interestingly, Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence presented an
alternative, yet opposite, conclusion of his fellow majority Justices.
There, he suggested that if the Court was required to choose between
“two bright-line rules,” one that always allowed for a search when one
occupant consents and the other that never allowed for a search, he
preferred the former.153 He based his understanding upon the need
for police to search in exigent circumstances as well as the diminution
of an expectation of privacy between co-occupants.154 Nevertheless,
Justice Breyer supported the majority because the Fourth Amendment
“does not insist upon bright-line rules.”155
Chief Justice Roberts strenuously dissented.156 He criticized the
“widely shared social expectations” standard and accused the majority
of providing Fourth Amendment protection “on a random and
happenstance basis.”157 In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the majority’s
“widely shared social expectations” understanding of privacy failed to
provide a “promising foundation on which to ground a constitutional
rule.”158 Like the majority, Chief Justice Roberts positioned his analysis
of disputed consent on privacy grounds;159 however, he relied upon the
Court’s earlier “assumption of the risk” justification160 and declared
150

In Olson, the police executed a warrantless entry into the home of another in
order to arrest Olson. The opinion stated the police neither obtained consent to enter
nor possessed an exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement. See id. at 93, 101.
151
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113.
152
Id. (“[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would
have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to
enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay out.’ Without some very good
reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.”).
153
Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
157
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (condemning the
inconsistent application of the majority’s rule protection for “a co-occupant who
happens to be at the front door when the other occupant consents to a search, but not
one napping or watching television in the next room”).
158
Id. at 130.
159
But see id. at 131 (“Whatever social expectation the majority seeks to protect, it
is not one of privacy.”).
160
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (deciding there is no
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“[i]f an individual shares information, papers, or places with another,
he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to
that information or those papers or places with the government.”161
Justice Scalia joined the dissenters but also filed a brief dissent of
his own.162 At the time of his dissent in Randolph, it is doubtful that
many would have considered his remarks as instructive. Through
hindsight, however, Justice Scalia’s dissent provided an opening volley
to those that would later witness the resurrection of the property-based
test for searches. Justice Scalia reminded the Court that “[f]rom the
date of its ratification until well into the 20th century, violation of the
[Fourth] Amendment was tied to common-law trespass.”163 He
maintained, “someone who had power to license the search of a house
by a private party could authorize a police search.”164 This signaled a
potential for differing result in Randolph, depending on the test used
to establish a Fourth Amendment search.
Perhaps the members of the Court, including Justice Scalia, could
not have fully imagined the cloudy horizon ahead in light of Jones and
its impact on the law of search. Unfortunately, Fernandez v. California
provides further obscurity.
B. Fernandez v. California (Post-Jones): Yes Trumps No When the
Objector Is Arrested and Removed from the Scene
Because of the Randolph decision, the rule involving consent of
physically present co-occupants was clear: no trumped yes. By the time
the police arrived at a Los Angeles apartment door in 2009, it was also
clear to the occupant, Walter Fernandez, what the rule was when he
exclaimed: “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my
rights.”165 In the span of one hour, however, Fernandez was arrested
and removed from the scene, and the police had returned to the
apartment and obtained consent to search the home from another
occupant.166 How the police officers and Fernandez got to this moment
requires explaining.
Fernandez was suspected of an earlier gang related robbery.167

justifiable expectation of privacy in confiding in “false friends”—government agents
or informants—who are recording their conversations).
161
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
162
Id. at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163
Id. at 143.
164
Id.
165
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (citation omitted).
166
Id.
167
Id.
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Later, officers were dispatched to investigate the crime, and an
individual bystander indicated that a potential suspect was “in the
apartment.”168 While there, the officers noticed a man running toward
the building identified by the witness as the respondent.169 Moments
later, the officers heard sounds that they associated with fighting and
screaming coming from the direction of the apartment building.170
The police approached the door to the apartment, where they thought
they had heard the furor, and attempted to contact the occupants.171
A woman, identified as Roxanne Rojas, opened the door and spoke
with the police.172
The officers noticed that Rojas appeared to have been involved in
a recent altercation and that she exhibited signs of physical injury.173
The officers asked Rojas if there was anyone else in the residence, and
she explained that no one else was there except for the baby in her
arms and her four-year-old son.174 Despite her claims, the police
requested that Rojas come out of the apartment so that the police
could conduct a “protective sweep”175 of the apartment.176 Before the
police invaded the apartment, Fernandez emerged from the domicile
and uttered his “rights” as detailed above.177
Based upon the evidence obtained from the frightened bystander
earlier and the officers’ personal observations of the injuries sustained
by Rojas, the officers arrested Fernandez and transported him to the
police station for processing.178 One hour later, one of the officers
returned to the apartment and sought consent from Rojas to search
the home.179 Rojas gave the officer both oral and written consent to
search, and, as a result of the search, the officer obtained incriminating

168

Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
172
Id.
173
Rojas explained to the police that she had been in a fight. In addition, the
police observed that “[h]er face was red,” that “she had a large bump on her nose,”
and that there was “blood on her shirt and hand.” Id.
174
Id.
175
See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (“The Fourth
Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an inhome arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific
and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger
to those on the arrest scene.”).
176
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
169
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evidence of Fernandez’s involvement in the robbery reported earlier.180
Fernandez was charged with a number of offenses related to the
seized evidence, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in
the consent search.181 The trial court denied his motion, and the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the basis that
Fernandez was not a physically present objector at the time of
consent.182 Fernandez thought he knew his rights when he challenged
the officers’ request to search. At the Supreme Court, the Justices
sought to clear up the dispute between what appeared to be two
conflicting co-occupants. Does no trump yes here?
At first blush, the Fernandez case appeared to resolve an issue that
was contemplated from dicta in Randolph; namely, whether the
protections of disputed consent in Randolph should extend to a
situation where the police removed an objecting co-occupant and later
sought consent from a remaining co-occupant.183 Instead, the Court
refused to expand the “narrow exception”184 of Randolph to the
Fernandez facts.185 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held “that an
occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in
the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason.”186
The majority concluded that Fernandez was not present when Rojas
gave consent, and, therefore, Randolph did not apply.187
Justice Alito’s majority opinion continued to apply the privacy test
of “widely shared social expectations” that was first announced in
Randolph.188 In addressing Fernandez’s contentions that he made an
180

Id. at 1130–31.
Id. at 1131.
182
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
183
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121–22 (2006) (addressing the “fine
line” drawn by the majority decision and noting that “[s]o long as there is no evidence
that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for
the sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity
of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when there is no
fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow
occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it”).
184
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133 (recognizing that Randolph provided a narrow
exception to the rule that “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is
generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search”).
185
See id. at 1134 (distinguishing that the dicta in Randolph “should not be read to
suggest that improper motive may invalidate objectively justified removal”).
186
Id. The Court’s decision was based upon a 6-3 vote, with Chief Justice Roberts,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer joining Justice Alito’s majority opinion.
Justices Scalia and Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
187
See id.
188
Id. at 1135.
181
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objection while physically present and that his objection should
continue after his removal, Justice Alito relied upon social
expectations of the “caller” in Randolph.189 This rationale is derived
from the idea that a “caller standing at the door of shared premises
would have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a
sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there
saying, ‘stay out.’”190 Justice Alito distinguished the potential “caller”
in Randolph from the one in Fernandez because the “objecting tenant
was not standing at the door,” and “when the objector is not on the
scene (and especially when it is known that the objector will not return
during the course of the visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely
to accept the invitation to enter.”191
Although Justice Alito steered the majority analysis in the case of
disputed consent onto the well-worn path of privacy scrutiny, Justice
Scalia, however, blazed a new trail away from Randolph toward a
property-based understanding. In a brief concurrence, Justice Scalia
disputed the claims, contained in the amicus brief of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, that Fernandez “had a right
under property law to exclude the police.”192 And for at least the third
time in the past two years of the decisional law of the Court, Justice
Scalia ushered a trespass test into the fray: this time in cases of disputed
consent. In his concurrence, he reiterated the property-based inquiry,
born from his opinions of Jones and Jardines, and examined the issue of
whether the police committed a trespass when they entered the
apartment upon the consent of a co-occupant.193
Justice Scalia contemplated the possibility of a disputed analysis
in Fernandez: would the dual tests for a search account for opposite
conclusions? On the one hand, he joined the majority’s “faithful
application of Randolph.”194 On the other hand, Justice Scalia identified
the potential problem of disputed consent analysis and maintained
that he “would therefore find this a more difficult case if it were
established that property law did not give petitioner’s co[-]tenant the
right to admit visitors over petitioner’s objection.”195 While he
acknowledged that there was “limited authority” for examination on

189

Id. (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006)).
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 1137 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193
Id. at 1137–38.
194
But see id. at 1137 (stating that Justice Scalia believed Randolph “was wrongly
decided”).
195
Id. at 1137–38 (emphasis added).
190
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this position, he explicated, “[t]hat difficulty does not arise, however,
because the authorities cited by the amicus association fail to establish
that a guest would commit a trespass if one of two joint tenants invited
the guest to enter and the other tenant forbade the guest to do so.”196
For Justice Scalia, his dilemma was solved in Fernandez. There was
no crisis of disputed analysis in the context of disputed consent. Both
paths of search law, privacy and property, came to the same
destination: the police acted reasonably under the Fourth
Amendment. While the other Justices failed to address the property
concerns in their decisions and opinions,197 the shadow of trespass still
looms large. Given the current makeup of the Court, and given Justice
Scalia’s restoration of the trespass test, have we arrived at an arrested
development? Is there room for consistent application of both tests?
If the answer is no, where do we go from here?
III. ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: HAS THE COURT ARRESTED OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF SEARCH LAW BY ITS ADHERENCE TO THE DUAL
TESTS FOR A SEARCH?
“Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come
back.”198
With the exception of Justice Scalia’s concurrence, there is little,
if any, mention of the trespass test found in the written words of the
Justices from Fernandez. Assuredly, however, the property-based test
was not forgotten. Prior to oral arguments, the attorneys of record and
the various amici struggled with how to apply both privacy and property
rationales to their respective positions. In briefs filed to the Court
from both sides, the attorneys sought to demonstrate that, no matter
what standard the Court employed, their side would prevail.199 Even at
196

Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1138 (Justice Scalia added “what limited authority there
is on the subject points to the opposite conclusion.”).
197
Id. at 1138–44 (Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence, maintaining his
objections over the Randolph decision. He urged the application of Chief Justice
Roberts’s “assumption of the risk” dissent in Randolph as the proper rationale. Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, filed a dissenting opinion, calling
for “straightforward application of Randolph.”).
198
See FROST, supra note 1, at 9.
199
See, e.g., Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126
(2014) (No. 12-7822), 2013 WL 4072519, at *17 (“Whether viewed through the lens of
property law or common sense, the result is the same: The prior objection of one cotenant renders a later invitation from another ineffective.”). See also Respondent’s
Brief on the Merits at 29, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) (No. 127822), 2013 WL 5400266, at *29 (“[G]enerally accepted principles of property law
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oral arguments, the Justices considered the import of property law
upon their deliberations.200 Trespass is alive. Questions concerning
the continuing vitality and prominence remain to be answered.
While it is clear that Justice Scalia is the chief originator of the
resurgence of the property-based test for a search, he has had
companions to join him, as seen through the decisions of Jones and
Jardines.201 His concurrence in Fernandez establishes an attempt to
advance forward a property-based intrusion inquiry. Using the notion
of a property interest in trespass as our guide, is Justice Scalia correct
in stating the police may enter the home on the basis of consent of one
co-occupant in spite of the objection of another co-occupant? If Justice
Scalia is right, then is Randolph wrongly decided, at least in terms of a
reasonable search under trespass? If Justice Scalia’s reasoning creates
the potential inconsistent application of search law, what does the legal
landscape hold for future decisions?
As a starting point, Justice Kennedy may have been right when he
stated at oral arguments: “There’s just not a lot of help in property
law.”202 This statement may be appropriate for at least three reasons.
First, the Court has had a troubled history defining and specifically
articulating how property relates, if at all, to a search inquiry. The
Court has stated the Fourth Amendment is “not limited by the law of
property”203 and property is “not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations.”204 Of course the Court in Katz went so far as
to proclaim that trespass is no longer applicable.205 Yet, the Court has
also declared with equal force that the Fourth Amendment “reflects its

support Rojas’s right to admit visitors of her choice in petitioner’s absence; and the
common law would preclude an action for trespass against such visitors.”).
200
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1126 (2014) (No. 12-7822), 2013 WL 6908199, at *48. Justice Kennedy questioned
Joseph Palmore, attorney for the United States, as amicus curiae for respondent, about
property law, and stated: “I think the property law cases that you cite, pages 2425 of
your brief, I had thought originally that this would be the principal focus of our
decisions in these cases, but it’s—it’s marginally in your favor. It’s not really very
strong. I mean, you have an 1839 North Carolina case and the CJS case. There’s just
not a lot of help in property law.” Id.
201
See Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United States v. Jones
(2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 508–10 (2013) (detailing
Justice Scalia’s “inability to hold votes for his analysis” previously and questioning
whether Justice Scalia can maintain support for the trespass analysis in Jones).
202
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 200.
203
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006).
204
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Soldal v. Cook
Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)).
205
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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close connection to property”206 and that common law trespass analysis
is the foundation that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”207
Second, despite this undecided importance of trespass, even
when it is considered, the Court does not precisely resolve how the
rules of property (or tort, for that matter) are to be administered. Even
if property law is utilized, how close will it follow prior Fourth
Amendment understandings? Exactly what kind of trespass test is being
exercised, and does it depend on the type of protected interest?208
Finally, in the context of the disputed consent cases, such as
Fernandez and Randolph, there may not be a lot of help with property
law, specifically as it relates to how property rights may affect consent
to enter by a co-occupant over the express refusal of another cooccupant.209 In his concurrence in Fernandez, even Justice Scalia
conceded that there is “limited authority” on the subject.210 In light of
this dearth of evidence, is it even possible to conclude whether or not
the police committed trespass in a disputed consent case? What
follows is but one attempt to respond to that question.
A. Justice Scalia’s View of Trespass: All You Need Is Yes?
Through the recent opinions of Justice Scalia, we get a picture of
the winding path that leads to the law of trespass under the Fourth
Amendment. What has evolved over time is a three-part inquiry. First,
a governmental trespass, as understood by Justice Scalia, is established
when there is a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected

206

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Id. at 952.
208
See Kerr, supra note 18, at 91 (suggesting that the Jones trespass test “tracks the
common law doctrine most directly suited to each of the four constitutionally
protected areas,” such as “trespass to land for acts concerning houses, trespass to
chattels for acts concerning papers and effects, and trespass to the person for acts
concerning persons”).
209
See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1138 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
210
See id. (Addressing the claims of an amicus brief that a guest would commit
trespass in the case of disputed consent, Justice Scalia stated, “[i]ndeed, what limited
authority there is on the subject points to the opposite conclusion.”). But see Brief of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 199, at *18. This amicus brief cited 2 HERBERT. THORNDIKE
TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 457 (3d ed. 1939) for the
proposition that “each joint tenant is entitled to possession of the whole, each is
enabled to defend the estate against strangers.” That same authority recognized that
“there is little authority” in this area.
207
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area,211 enumerated under the Fourth Amendment212 (“persons,
houses, papers, and effects”).213 In the case of governmental intrusion,
the house is considered as the single greatest zone of protection.214
Trespass alone, however, is not actionable. Second, there must exist a
trespass by the police, coupled with “an attempt to find something or
to obtain information.”215 Finally, a “search” is recognized when the
government commits an “unlicensed”216 physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area for the purpose of gathering
information.
Of course, the problem in determining whether there is a search
in the disputed consent cases is whether the government committed
an “unlicensed physical intrusion” when it entered the home over the
objection of a physically present co-occupant. In answering this
indispensible question, Justice Scalia provides little explication. In his
opinion in Jardines, he suggested a “background social norms”
framework established the creation of an implied license.217
Specifically, Justice Scalia was concerned that the police were not
licensed to walk up to the front porch of a house with a drug-detection
dog for the purposes of obtaining evidence of illegality.218 For Justice
Scalia, “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front
door do not invite the visitor to conduct a search.”219
In addition, while describing licenses as either express or implied,
Justice Scalia demonstrated that the scope of a license “is limited not
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”220
Notwithstanding the facts of Jardines dealing with the question of an
implied license, Justice Scalia considered the circumstances of consent

211

But see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (concluding that there was
no search under the Fourth Amendment even though the government committed a
common-law trespass on what has been called an “open field”).
212
Justice Scalia explained that the Oliver decision was correctly decided under
trespass law because “an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of those
protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
213
See id. at 950.
214
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“[T]he home is first among
equals.”).
215
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951.
216
See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
217
Id. (“‘A license may be implied from the habits of the country,’ notwithstanding
the ‘strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close.’”) (quoting McKee
v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).
218
Id. at 1416.
219
Id.
220
Id.
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to explain in dicta the limitation of a license’s scope.221 Although
Justice Scalia connected consent to that of an express license, he failed
to offer any further clue as to its meaning or application.
The idea of consent as a license to trespass does not appear again
until Scalia’s Fernandez concurrence. There, instead of citing to the
idea of “background social norms,” Justice Scalia formulated his
license argument upon a more traditional property foundation of
creation and revocation of licenses between co-occupants. He
proposed that the consent of a co-occupant created an express
license.222 While he acknowledged the scant amount of authority to
address the situation before the Court, Justice Scalia quoted a portion
of a provision from the secondary source, Corpus Juris Secundum, that
seemed to address the issue precisely223:
It is ordinarily held that a tenant in common may properly
license a third person to enter on the common property.
The licensee, in making an entry in the exercise of his or her
license, is not liable in trespass to nonconsenting co[-]tenants,
particularly in the absence of excessive or negligent use of
the right granted and in the absence of fraud in procuring
the license.224
In spite of the fact that Justice Scalia mentioned conflicting secondary
source authority, cited by an amicus brief that suggested an “opposite
view” to his concurrence, he quickly dismissed it by noting that the
source conceded “there is little authority” on the topic.225 What Justice
Scalia lacked in analysis on this issue, he made up for in his
unambiguous claim that “[t]here . . . is no basis for us to conclude that
the police infringed on any property right of [Fernandez]’s when they
entered the premises with his co[-]tenant’s consent.”226
If we were to take Justice Scalia at his word in the Fernandez
concurrence, it would seem that, despite the objections of Fernandez,
consent to police entry of the home by Rojas, the co-occupant, would
amount to a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

221

Justice Scalia explored the hypothetical of the police receiving and obtaining
the consent of an automobile driver to search the vehicle for evidence relating to an
anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk. He went on to say that the consent to
search “does not permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics.” Id.
222
See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1138 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
223
Id.
224
86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 144 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing Dinsmore
v. Renfroe, 225 P. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924); Williams v. Brunton, 113 S.E. 319 (S.C.
1922); Mason v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 50 S.E. 782 (S.C. 1905)).
225
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1138 (Scalia, J., concurring).
226
Id.
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Irrespective of the issue of whether a co-occupant was a physically
present objector, the only concern is whether any co-occupant
consented to a physical entry. In other words, under a trespass-based
inquiry for a search in cases of disputed consent, yes will trump no.
If Justice Scalia is right about this rule, it would appear that the
Randolph decision would reach in an inconsistent and divergent
outcome if it were decided under the trespass test, as opposed to the
privacy test of “shared social expectations.” Much like the question of
whether no trumps yes in disputed consent cases, the new question for
the post-Jones Court will be whether no trumps yes in cases of disputed
search analysis (privacy vs. property).227 In other words, would the Court
hold that a police search was reasonable with respect to one test, but
unreasonable with respect to the other?
B. It’s Not Just About You (or the Police), It’s About Me: Co-Occupants
and the Right to Exclude Under Trespass
There is, however, authority beyond Justice Scalia’s concurrence
in Fernandez to suggest that a co-occupant may, in fact, grant a license
to enter over the objections of another co-occupant. Under existing
property theory, a co-occupant may give consent (a license) to another
for entry or use of the property of a shared dwelling, so long as the
other co-occupant is not dispossessed of his rights in the property. The
licensee would not be liable in trespass, because the licensee stands in
the shoes of the consenting co-occupant. By the co-occupant’s grant
of the license, the licensee enjoys the same benefit to enter the
property, similar to the co-occupant grantor. What follows below is an
attempt to advance Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Fernandez.
Initially, when considering the law of trespass, there are a variety
of legal disciplines one could consider (property, tort, criminal law,
etc.). While there is a convergence of ideas on the subject of trespass,
the law of property has been consistently utilized by the Court to
provide guidance on the topic of search law under the Fourth
Amendment. When considering an individual’s property rights,
including the question of whether a co-occupant may refuse entry of a
guest, careful consideration must be given to the origin and nature of

227

But see Kerr, supra note 18, at 97 (“Jones bifurcates the search inquiry, but it may
do so without changing the results in many (or even any) cases.”).
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property.228 What is property? 229 What rights are conferred under it?
Although there are many ways to think about property, the
Supreme Court has focused principally on the rights of exclusion,
possession, use, and disposition to comprise the “bundle of sticks” that
is property.230 Of these, the right to exclude has been characterized as
the “sine qua non”231 in defining property.232 It would seem that the very
existence of property is tied to the ability to exclude others.233 To the
causal eye, if the right to exclude was understood simply in terms of
denying an individual from the property, then it would suggest that an
objecting co-occupant could refuse entry onto his property and that
the rule in disputed consent cases should be that no trumps yes. Thus,
the rule in Randolph would be reaffirmed under a property analysis.
The fallacy in that suggestion, however, ignores the proper
context of how the right to exclude applies. This is particularly true as
it relates to the conception of property between co-occupants, each
holding sticks within their bundle. To be sure, the question should be
framed in terms of an individual’s relationship to the property. In
situations involving co-occupants similar to those in Randolph and
Fernandez, however, there must be a careful examination of the
conjunction between the individuals associated to each other by the
property. Here, the paradigm shifts from looking solely at the right
under the property to the relationship between the parties connected to
the property. Focusing on the relationship between co-occupants of a
property interest, and how their relationship affects their rights to
property, demonstrates how the law of trespass operates concerning
each co-occupant.
More importantly, though, it is this relationship between cooccupants that explains how their rights are affected when a nonowner third-party is involved with the property. Between individuals 234
228

See Michael B. Kent & Lance McMillian, The World of Deadwood: Property Rights
and the Search for Human Identity, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY. L.J. 489, 505 (2011)
(“Despite this seeming importance, property’s precise origins, along with its proper
definition, have long been a subject matter of intense debate.”).
229
See generally Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003).
230
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
231
See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998).
232
See id. at 740 (“[I]f one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive
most of the other attributes commonly associated with property . . . .”).
233
See id. at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource,
i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the human demand for it, and you give them
property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”).
234
I have used the term “occupant” or “co-occupant” throughout this Article to
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who share an interest in property, the general rule is clear that a cooccupant may not maintain a trespass action against another cooccupant.235 The motivation supporting this rule is premised upon the
understanding that the co-occupants are each entitled to the
possession, entry, and use of the entire premises.236 Since both cooccupants have a present property interest that grants them the right
to possess and use, the co-occupants stand on equal footing and may
not exclude the other. Essentially, the co-tenant’s relationship to the
other, with respect to the property, precludes the right to exclude a cotenant in trespass.
The only exception to the prohibition of a trespass action is when
the balance of the relationship between co-occupants has been
significantly altered, amounting to ouster. Ouster “is the wrongful
dispossession or exclusion by one tenant of his co[-]tenant or co[]tenants from the common property of which they are entitled to
possession.”237 In order to prove ouster, there must exist more than
describe the relationship between two individuals who possess “common authority”
over the property. See supra note 11. In many of the cases and examples that follow,
however, the various courts will use the terms such as “co-tenant,” “tenant in common,”
“co-owner,” etc. to describe the parties involved. For purposes of our analysis, the
distinction between the interests is not determinative to our understanding under this
section.
235
See, e.g., Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., Inc., 944 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“Illinois does not permit tenants in common to sue each other for trespass.”)
(citations omitted); Conklin v. Newman, 115 N.E. 849, 851 (Ill. 1917) (“It is elementary
that one tenant in common cannot be guilty of committing a trespass upon property
which he owns in common with another.”); Davis v. Polard, 66 A. 380, 382 (Me. 1906)
(“It is a general rule of law that a tenant in common cannot maintain an action of
trespass quare clausum against his co-tenant.”) (citations omitted); Mueller v. Allen,
128 P.3d 18, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]respass cannot ordinarily be maintained by
one co-owner of real property against another for such acts as merely entering the
property, or the like.”) (citation omitted).
236
See, e.g., Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 52 A.2d 2, 4 (Conn. 1947) (“Ordinarily
possession of one tenant in common is possession of all.”) (citations omitted); Jemzura
v. Jemzura, 330 N.E.2d 414, 419 (N.Y. 1975) (“[A] tenant in common has the right to
take and occupy the whole of the premises and preserve them from waste or injury, so
long as he or she does not interfere with the right of a co[-]tenant to also occupy the
premises.”) (citations omitted); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1984)
(“A tenant in common has the right to use and occupy the entire property held in co[]tenancy without liability to other co[-]tenants.”); Mueller, 128 P.3d at 24 (“[E]ach co[]tenant has a legal right to enter upon and enjoy the common property . . . .”) (citation
omitted). See also 2 HERBERT. THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 426 (rev. 3d ed. Supp. 2012) (“Each co[-]tenant has a right to enter upon,
explore and possess the entire premises, and to do so without the consent of his co[]tenants, though he may not do so to the exclusion of his co[-]tenants to do likewise.”)
(citation omitted).
237
See, e.g., Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1946). See also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy
in Common § 108 (2006) (stating “an action for trespass may arise against a co[-]tenant
who has actually ousted another.”).

BOYD (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

10/24/2015 11:22 AM

ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT IN SEARCH LAW

33

the mere exclusive use or possession by a co-occupant over another.238
Under ouster, a co-occupant attempts to unlawfully exercise his right
to exclude a co-occupant that shares an interest in the property. In
these situations, the excluded co-occupant may obtain an action for
trespass.239
While it is clear that co-occupants may not be liable for trespass,
what happens when a third-party, who maintains no property interest,
attempts to enter the property? Ordinarily, a co-occupant may exclude
the individual from the property.240 At the heart of the disputed
consent cases of Randolph and Fernandez, however, is the question: what
happens if one of the co-occupants invites the third-party to enter the
property, over the objection of the other co-occupant? Can the
objecting co-occupant exclude the third-party? Whose property rights
control? In other words, can a co-occupant assert his right to exclude
under trespass, despite another co-occupant’s invitation to enter? As
before, the question remains whether no will trump yes.
As a starting point, a co-occupant’s right to exclude is nuanced
and far from absolute.241 Indeed, as Professor Merrill explained, there
exists “a qualified complex of exclusion rights, in which owners
exercise relatively full exclusion rights with respect to certain kinds of
intrusion (e.g., by strangers) but highly qualified or even nonexistent
exclusion rights with respect to other kinds of intrusions (e.g., low-level
nuisances).”242 One such “nonexistent exclusion right” exists in the
context of a license.243 A license has been described as a “waiver of the
238

See Gillmor, 694 P.2d at 1040; see also Willis v. Mann, 386 S.E.2d 68, 71 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (Ouster “involves ‘an entry or possession of one tenant in common that
enables a co[-]tenant to bring ejectment against him[,]’” and the “entry or possession
must be a clear, positive, and unequivocal act equivalent to an open denial of [the co[]tenant’s] right and to putting him out of the seizin.”) (citations omitted).
239
See Mueller, 128 P.3d at 24 (“An action for trespass, however, ‘may arise against
a co[-]tenant who has actually ousted another.’”) (citations omitted). See also Harman
v. Gartman, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 430, 432 (1824) (Gantt, J., dissenting) (“It is admitted,
that where there is an ouster, the converse of the rule holds good, that trespass may be
maintained.”); 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 108 (2006) (stating that a trespass action
“may arise against a co[-]tenant who has actually ousted another”).
240
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”).
241
See Merrill, supra note 231, at 753 (describing “a complex tapestry of property
rights of different sorts (private, public, common) with different types and degrees of
exclusion rights being exercised by different sorts of entities in different contexts”).
242
Id.
243
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919–20 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a license as “[a]
personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing
any estate or interest therein, and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licensor and
is not assignable”).
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right to exclude.”244 Specifically, a license is “an authority given to do
some one act, or series of acts, on the land of another, without passing
any estate in the land,”245 and may include permission to enter upon
the property.246 When a co-occupant grants a license to a non-owner,
the third-party may enter the property lawfully without fear of
committing trespass.247
So how can it be that an objecting co-occupant, who has a present
interest in the property, cannot exclude under trespass a mere licensee,
who has no property interest? The answer pivots upon the relationship
between those who have the property interest: the co-occupants. Just
as the co-occupants may not assert a trespass claim, absent ouster,
against one another, neither may the objecting co-occupant bring a
trespass suit against the licensee. In essence, the licensee, by having
permission to enter the property by one co-occupant, has the same
protection as the licensor against exclusion from another co-occupant.
The licensee “stands in the shoes” of the licensor and cannot be
excluded under trespass.
This theory that the licensee stands in the shoes of the licensor is
exemplified in the case of Buchanan v. Jencks.248 In Buchanan, the
plaintiff, along with several other individuals as tenants in common,
held a property interest in a five-acre wood lot.249 One of the other
tenants sold his interest in the timber, and the buyer then conferred
upon the defendant the right to cut and remove the wood.250 After the
defendant entered the property and removed the timber from the lot,
the plaintiffs (other co-tenants of the lot) brought an action against
the defendant for trespass and the unlawful removal of the wood.251
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated the rule that a co-tenant may
not commit trespass against another co-tenant, absent ouster.252 The
court went on to explain that the licensor, who was a tenant in
common, had a right to enter the property without committing
244

See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 884 (2014).
See Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533, 537–38 (1814) (stating that a license
“amount[s] to nothing more than an excuse for the act, which would otherwise be a
trespass”).
246
See Causee v. Anders, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 388, 389 (1839). See also, 2
HERBERT. THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 432 (3d ed.
1939).
247
See Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31, 42 (1881) (explaining that a license “only
makes an action lawful, which, without it, had been unlawful”).
248
96 A. 307 (R.I. 1916).
249
Id. at 308.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 309.
245
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trespass.253 When it described the rights of the defendant licensee, the
court declared:
We see no reason why a co[-]tenant in the enjoyment of his
rights as such cannot authorize another to do whatever he might
lawfully do himself. A contrary view, if followed to its logical
conclusion, would restrict a co[-]tenant’s enjoyments of the
common property to the sphere of his own personal activities
and would deprive him of the aid of others whom he might
desire or need to employ.254
The rationale that a licensee may “do whatever [the licensor]
might lawfully do himself” was reiterated later in the Buchanan
opinion, when the court described the licensee as “standing in the place
of a co[-]tenant.”255 The court went on to hold that the defendant
licensee could not be liable in trespass to the other co-tenants.256 In
addition, other cases have reinforced the reasoning of “standing in the
place” from Buchanan.257
Based upon the relationships of co-occupants and the rights
relating to property of a shared domicile, there is evidence to conclude
that a licensee, like that of the police officers in Randolph and
Fernandez, would have the same rights of entry into the home as the cooccupant licensor. If that is the case, then the objecting co-occupant
may not allege that the police committed a trespass. In fact, the
253

Id.
Buchanan, 96 A. at 309. (emphasis added).
255
Id. at 309–10 (emphasis added).
256
Id. at 310–11 (“But a co[-]tenant cannot be said to be guilty of a trespass quare
clausum fregit for the reason that he has, in common with his co[-]tenants, a right to
enter upon the premises, and such entry does not constitute a trespass. Neither could
the defendant be guilty of trespass in entering the close because he entered upon the
authority of Thayer who was a co[-]tenant with the plaintiffs.”).
257
In Causee v. Anders, the defendant, a tenant in common, assaulted the plaintiff
(who had no property interest), knocking out three teeth, when the plaintiff and
another tenant in common entered the property. The plaintiff asserted the defendant
could not “treat [plaintiff] in the manner proven” since the plaintiff “was there under
the authority” of another tenant in common. The defendant argued there was a
“distinction between the tenant in common and one who, like the plaintiff, was there
by the authority of his co-tenant.” The trial court determined that defendant’s
position was “not supported by law” and the appellate court subsequently affirmed the
result. See 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 388, 388–89 (1839). See also Dinsmore v.
Renfroe, 225 P. 886, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (explaining that a tenant in common
may by license “confer upon another person the right to occupy and use the property
of the cotenancy as fully as such lessor . . . himself might have used or occupied it”);
Williams v. Bruton, 113 S.E. 319, 325 (S.C. 1922) (“[W]here one tenant in common
has granted a permit or license to a public service corporation to enter and construct
its line, there is no foundation for an action of trespass in the absence of evidence of
excessive or negligent use of the right granted.”). See also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common
§ 144 (2006).
254
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objecting co-occupant may no more charge trespass against a licensee
than he could accuse the other co-occupant of trespass. While any
person with an interest in the property may have the right to exclude,
that right is not applicable to other individuals who have an interest in
the possession and use of the property. Put another way, a licensee
may not be excluded since he stands in the shoes of the licensor cotenant. Therefore, using Justice Scalia’s test for a search under the
property-based analysis, the police committed a licensed physical
intrusion that amounted to a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. In the cases of Randolph and Fernandez, the consent of
the co-occupant granted the police a license to enter, over the protests
of another co-occupant. Therefore, under property conceptions, the
rule in Randolph is turned on its head: yes now trumps no.
Notwithstanding the importance of the right to exclude, there has
been some recent discussion among scholars that the right to include
must be regarded as important in defining the nature of property.258
Within the framework of a co-occupant granting a third-party a license
to enter, the grantor waives his right to exclude and, instead, gives the
individual “a ‘permission slip’ from the owner to a non-owner.”259 If
the right to include is related to property, it would seem this would be
yet another reason why a co-occupant may validly license another to
enter his property. Under those facts, a dissenting co-occupant should
not able to thwart another co-occupant’s consent to waive the right to
exclude. Permission is given, and any refusal to honor the right to
include should be denied. Again, the rule from property is that yes
trumps no.
C. Are We There Yet? Some Final Thoughts on the Landscape of the
Privacy/Trespass Dispute
It is hard to say exactly where the Court will go in search law
generally or in disputed consent situations specifically in the post-Jones
era. While many questions remain unanswered, at least three concerns
are worth noting at the present. First, how will the Justices treat the
twin tests for search? In other words, should the Court treat the
separate tests of property and privacy in the disjunctive (either/or) for
each dispute? Or will the Court look to a single test in distinct
situations?260
258

See Kelly, supra note 244, at 869 (discussing Penner’s analogy of a property
owner as a gatekeeper that “can include as well as exclude”). See also JAMES E. PENNER,
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (1997).
259
See Kelly, supra note 244, at 884.
260
See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam)
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There exists evidence for both approaches in the current
language of the opinions. Specifically looking at Justice Scalia’s
language in Jones implies that both inquiries are complementary, in
that the privacy test “has been added to, not substituted for” a propertybased understanding.261 Later in the opinion, however, Justice Scalia
declared that trespass should be the exclusive test in cases, like Jones,
which involve actual physical invasion.262 Justice Scalia noted what he
called “particularly vexing problems” with the exclusivity of the Katz
expectations test and concluded that, “we may have to grapple with
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”263 Based upon
his conclusions in Jones, it appears that Justice Scalia would utilize the
Katz privacy-based inquiry only in “situations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”264
Although Justice Scalia has established a preference265 for the
trespass test to the exclusion of the privacy test in the physical invasion
factual scenarios, other members of the Court have suggested that the
search may be analyzed under either test. Justice Kagan, through her
concurrence in Jardines, exemplifies this view when she stated, “[t]he
Court today treats this case under a property rubric; I write separately
to note that I could just as happily have decided it by looking to
Jardines’[s] privacy interests.”266 Of course, some members of the
Court disagree with the current utilization of the trespass test to resolve
issues of search.267
In light of this ambiguity, created by the reintroduction of the
trespass test, the current problem before the Court is the lack of
guidance essential to help predict readily administrable search rules
for a given factual scenario. Which test controls, and when, if ever,
should the other test be viewed? Of course, the greater problem, as
explained above, is what happens if the two standards create

(concluding that the satellite-based monitoring of recidivist sex offenders by the
government is a search “since it [obtains information] by physically intruding on a
subject’s body”).
261
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
262
Id. at 953–54.
263
Id. at 954.
264
Id. at 953 (explaining that cases without trespass “would remain subject to Katz
analysis”).
265
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (“One virtue of the Fourth
Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”).
266
Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
267
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).

BOYD (DO NOT DELETE)

38

10/24/2015 11:22 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

diametrically opposing results?
A second unanswered question to be considered is what type of
trespass test has Justice Scalia created from Jones and Jardines? In
particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion from Jardines joined notions of
trespass with those of “background social norms.”268 Justice Ginsburg,
in her Fernandez dissent, loosely linked Justice Scalia’s “background
social norms” language to the conception of the pre-Jones “shared
societal expectations” rationale from the Randolph decision.269 The use
of “background social norms” in Justice Scalia’s reasoning could be
viewed as a retreat from a staunch physical intrusion trespass
examination.
Is Justice Scalia reading a societal expectations
requirement into his trespass test? To put it another way, is he
morphing his analysis into a privacy/property blend? While this may
not be the case, it nonetheless underscores the shifting sand the Court
stands upon in its case-by-case decisional law under the Fourth
Amendment.
Finally, it bears discussing the significant impact the issue of
domestic violence plays in the disputed consent cases of Randolph and
Fernandez. The Randolph majority drew considerable fire for its rule
that no trumps yes for consent to police searches, in part due to fear
that the rule operated to prevent the police from assisting potential
victims of domestic abuse.270 The Randolph majority, however, rebuked
the allegations and offered that the police could, in fact, lawfully enter
over the objections of a co-occupant in established exigent
circumstances, such as a domestic violence situation.271 In Fernandez,
however, the Court encountered the very situation contemplated in
Randolph: the present plight of domestic violence, involving an
objector suspected of committing the crime.272
Rather than address the concerns raised by both majority and
dissenting opinions in Randolph, the Fernandez Court refused to apply
the rule in Randolph.273 Instead of attempting to faithfully adhere to
the physically present objector rule (no trumps yes in disputed
consent), the Court determined Fernandez was a “very different
268

See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416–17.
See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1140–41 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
270
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 139 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“The majority’s rule apparently forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic
dispute if the abuser whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance
objects.”).
271
Id. at 118 (majority opinion).
272
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
273
Id.
269
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situation.”274 And while there appears to be no doubt as to the officers’
determination that there was sufficient probable cause to arrest
Fernandez on suspicion of domestic abuse, the majority opinion’s
endeavor to create an exception under these facts represents a slight
of hand. Fernandez was present at the home at the time of the police
officers’ first encounter, and he strenuously refused consent to
search.275 Is the Court allowing the image of the bloody and bruised
victim of domestic violence to cloud its prior decision from Randolph?
To put it another way, are the unsightly facts present in Fernandez
contributing to a poorly decided rationale?
Alternatively, could it be that Randolph was erroneous decided? Is
it possible Randolph is wrong, both in terms of the property- and
privacy-based standards? In that case, there is no discord. There is no
disputed analysis. Of course, that is not the current state of the law,
but how could the Court get there?
Under a Jones trespass analysis as presented in Parts II, III.A, and
III.B above, the Court could determine that Janet Randolph effectively
gave the police, by her consent to the officers, a license to enter the
home. As a result of her granting of the license to enter, the police
could not be found liable in trespass, despite the objections of a cooccupant. In essence, the police would stand in the shoes of the
grantor, Janet Randolph, and would be entitled to protection. Because
the officers are not trespassers, the search of the home on the basis of
her consent would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In
the context of the current state of the law, it appears that the propertybased inquiry most effectively addresses the domestic violence
concerns raised by the Randolph and Fernandez decisions. Additionally,
resolving the case under trespass prevents the Court from contorting
its reasoning under the privacy-based test, similar to what it did in
Fernandez.
Even under privacy-based concerns, the Court could reach a
similar holding that the search was reasonable by utilizing a Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy query. Instead of relying on “shared
social expectations,” which often reduce our Court to argue to impasse
over whether it is acceptable or not for the “hypothetical caller” to
come in, the Court should return to earlier traditions that hold that
when an individual shares information or a living space, he assumes
274

Id.
Id. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Does an occupant’s refusal to consent
lose force as soon as she absents herself from the doorstep, even if only for a moment?
Are the police free to enter the instant after the objector leaves the door to retire for
a nap, answer the phone, use the bathroom, or speak to another officer outside?”).
275
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the risk of a diminished expectation of privacy.276 But, that is not
currently the law in the context of disputed consent. For now,
Randolph controls, except when the Court says it does not, as it did in
Fernandez.
IV. CONCLUSION
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—I took the one less traveled by, and
that has made all the difference.”277
The current reality is deadlock. The path to understanding
modern search law is in dispute. Many have discussed whether we
should have two tests for a search or whether one test is better than
another. Undeniably, each test (privacy or property) has its strengths
and weaknesses. When it comes to the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy standard, a chief complaint is that “[i]t involves a degree of
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of
privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person.”278 At the
same time, the test has been praised for its flexibility to handle a variety
of situations requiring protection279 as well as its durability over the
course of history.280
So was the re-introduction of a property-based understanding a
better solution to search law? Ostensibly, the trespass standard is
attractive in that creates a seemingly bright-line test that “keeps easy
cases easy.”281 Similar to the Katz test, though, the trespass test has been
denounced as being “no less circular than the problematic privacy
analysis.”282 Most importantly is whether the trespass test anachronistic
276

See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If an individual shares
information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person
will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the
government.”).
277
See FROST, supra note 1, at 9.
278
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
279
See Kerr, supra note 52, at 507–08 (explaining that the reasonable expectation
of privacy standard is not a single test but can be broken down into “four relatively
distinct categories of argument used to justify whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists”).
280
See Kerr, supra note 18 at 94–95 (“The open-ended nature of the Katz test allows
the Court to pick models based on which best identifies the kinds of troublesome law
enforcement practices that are in need of regulation.”).
281
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
282
See David Steinberg, Florida v. Jardines: Privacy, Trespass, and the Fourth
Amendment, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 91, 109–10 (2013) (stating that the
“trespass doctrine does not seem like an improvement over the dominant privacy
analysis” and that it “would seem to make Fourth Amendment decisions turn on fine
and trivial factual details”).
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given the current technological and digital age, where the government
has the potential to monitor and gather information without ever
committing a physical intrusion, amounts to an unlawful trespass.
So how did we arrive at this destination? In the case of its Fourth
Amendment pronouncements, the Supreme Court often acts as a
common-law court, enlarging and contracting the “rule” as it sees fit,
given the current controversy presented. Professor Bradley eloquently
summed up this point in explaining the Court’s difficulties in its
Exclusionary Rule precedents:
The result is that the Court strives to justify such police
behavior by stretching existing doctrine to accommodate it.
Herein lies the inherent contradiction, and source of
confusion, in fourth amendment law: The Court tries on the
one hand to lay down clear rules for the police to follow in
every situation while also trying to respond flexibly, or
“reasonably,” to each case because a hard-line approach
would lead to exclusion of evidence. Since the rules are not
clear and since, even if they were, it is virtually impossible to
lay down a rule that anticipates all potential cases, the police
engage in behavior that does not conform to the rules but
that strikes the Court as having been essentially reasonable.
Given the Court’s predilection for clear-cut rules, however,
simply declaring such conduct “reasonable” and leaving it at
that is not enough. Instead, the Court offers a detailed
explanation as to how the police behavior really did conform
to the old rule (and in so doing, changes the contours of the
old rule), or creates a new rule to justify the behavior.
Naturally, such a holding spawns new litigation, which leads
to a new opinion, which leads to a new rule, etc.283
Much like the problem of disputed consent, where one cooccupant says yes and the other says no, we may very well have arrived
at a place in our Fourth Amendment understanding where disputed
analysis, trespass or privacy, threatens to cloud an already obscured
view of search law. Similar to the contentious and combative couples
in Randolph and Fernandez, supporters, as well as critics, of the current
jurisprudence find themselves mired in conflict. Indeed, we can see
that “two roads diverged in a wood.”284 It remains unknown, however,
which road we should follow and will it make “all the difference.” For
now, we are marooned to fight over the directions.

283
284

See Bradley, supra note 116, at 1470 (footnote omitted).
See FROST, supra note 1, at 9.

